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Private operation of port facilities is becoming increasingly common worldwide. We investi-
gate the e¤ect of port privatization in a setting with two ports located in di¤erent countries,
each serving their home market but also competing for the transshipment tra¢ c from a
third region. Each government chooses whether to privatize its port or to keep port op-
erations public. We show that there exist equilibria in which the two governments choose
privatization and the national welfare of each port country is higher relative to a situation
where ports are public. This is because privatization is a commitment to increase charges
relative to public port charges, which allows for a better exploitation of the third region.
For some parameter regions, port countries non-cooperatively choose public port operations,
while they would be better o¤ if both ports were private. However, customers of the third
region are always better o¤ if port operations are public. We further show that the port
country with the smaller home market has a relatively strong incentive to choose private
port operation.
Keywords: hub port, transport policy competition, infrastructure pricing, privatization
JEL Classication: L91, L98, R48
1 Introduction
The hub and spoke system in which hub ports are used to transship cargos from small ships
on feeder lines to larger ships on trunk lines is typically adopted in sea transportation. The
shares of transshipment tra¢ c at major ports are, for example, 81% in Singapore, 41% in
Busan, and 30% in Hong Kong (Shibasaki et al., 2005). Carriers benet from hub and spoke
systems because they are useful in fully exploiting economies in ship sizes. Operating a hub
port can also be benecial for national economies. This is because (i) importers and exporters
in the home countrys hinterland may enjoy lower transport cost and shorter lead time due
to direct connections from/to major origins/destinations and (ii) port prots contribute to
the national income. Hub ports typically possess localized monopoly power, yet there still
is signicant competition between hub ports for transshipment tra¢ c.
Since the 1980s, private operation of port facilities has become increasingly common
worldwide, and many governments are considering the privatization of public ports as a policy
option to raise the competitive position of their ports (for example, Midoro et al., 2005).
One reason frequently discussed is that private port operations may be more cost e¢ cient
(Tongzon and Heng, 2005).1 However, there may also be strategic reasons for governments
to opt for privatization, which may rely on higher port prots as part of national welfare.
Our paper tries to explore exactly this e¤ect.
To do so, we consider a two-stage game with two hub ports located in di¤erent countries.
These ports are used by domestic customers and, in addition, they collect transshipment
cargos from feeder ports in a third region. Two hub ports compete for transshipment tra¢ c.
At the rst stage, each government chooses whether to privatize its port or to keep port
operations public, where the governments objective is to maximize the national welfare. At
the second stage, ports choose prices (i.e., port charges). A public port chooses the price to
maximize national welfare, whereas a private port chooses the price to maximize its prot.
We focus on the aspect of privatization of infrastructure such that the managers objective
is shifted from welfare maximization under public operation to prot maximization.2 This
denition has been shared in the literature of economic analysis on the privatization, as
reviewed later. We show that, if the transshipment market is su¢ ciently large, both ports
are privatized in equilibrium and that the national welfare of the port countries increases
compared to a situation in which the ports are kept under public operation. Privatization
leads to higher port prices (similar to results shown by, e.g., Zhang and Zhang (2003) for
the case of airports), which tends to decrease national welfare due to a lower total surplus
in the domestic market. Welfare can, however, increase due to higher prots from the
transshipment market. For the exploitation of the third region like this, strategic interaction
between competing port operators plays a crucial role. Due to the transshipment market,
1Oum et al. (2008) investigate cost e¢ ciency of airports for various types of operations, including private,
public, and mixed regimes.
2This could also mean reducing the intensity of regulation of an already privatized rm. The public port
operation may be considered as the most extreme form of economic regulation because it involves complete
control over the rms behavior.
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port prices become strategic complements. Hence, choosing to privatize at the rst stage acts
as a commitment to charge high prices at stage two. The other port responds to this by also
choosing higher port prices, allowing for a better exploitation of the transshipment market.
Privatization can therefore be seen as a form of strategic delegation (Fershtman and Judd,
1987). Our result also suggests that there is too little privatization from the perspective of
the two port countries, since each government only accounts for their own increase in prots
from this strategic privatization decision. We further show that the smaller a countrys
domestic market is, the larger the incentive to privatize is, since the port prots become
relatively more important under these conditions.
There is growing literature on port competition. Veldman and Buckmann (2003) em-
pirically investigate carrier hub choices between European ports. Park et al. (2006) and
Anderson et al. (2008) construct a model that incorporates strategic investment decisions
between the competing ports of Shanghai and Busan for transshipment cargoes. De Borger
et al. (2008) consider a game with pricing and investment decisions of two congested ports
that share the same customers and each have a congested link to a common hinterland.
At the rst stage, local governments independently and simultaneously choose the port and
hinterland capacity, while ports independently and simultaneously choose port charges to
maximize prots at the second stage. A recent paper by Wan and Zhang (2013) is closely
related to De Borger et al. (2008), however they abstract away from port congestion and con-
sider both the hinterland capacity and road tolls as the rst-stage decision variables. Yuen
et al. (2008) consider a scenario with one gateway, oligopolistic carriers and a congested
hinterland such that the gateway chooses prices to maximize the sum of gateway and carrier
prots, and the road charges are chosen to maximize the hinterlands welfare. Xiao, Ng and
Fu (2010) compare the pricing and investment rules for three types of port ownerships: fully
privatized, partially privatized, and government controlled. None of the studies mentioned
theoretically analyzes the decision whether to privatize ports.3
Privatization of infrastructure is the topic of recent papers by Matsumura and Mat-
sushima (2012b) and Mantin (2012) on airports, as well as Matsushima and Takauchi (2014)
on seaports.4 These papers investigate privatization decisions in a game with a framework
and timing similar to ours. They nd that privatization may improve national welfare and
that governments do indeed have an excessive incentive to privatize since they do not account
for the negative externalities imposed on other regions. Our application, and therefore the
modeling approach, di¤ers from these contributions. First, in their model the infrastruc-
ture services (airport or port services) are complementary, while in our paper port services
are substitutes. Second, all demand for infrastructure services stems from one of the two
countries, i.e., there is no third region, whereas in our paper, competition for the third
region is a major driver of the results. Third, our results di¤er from those obtained in the
3For an overview of the literature on transport policy competition between governments, see De Borger
and Proost (2012).
4In a recent discussion paper, Lin and Mantin (2013) analyze the welfare e¤ects of airport privatization
in a setup that captures domestic as well as international air tra¢ c, while Mantin (2012) and Matsumura
and Matsushima (2012b) concentrate on international air tra¢ c.
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other studies, since in our model, governments can have an excess incentive to keep ports
public. This is due to the fact that there is competition for the third region, which triggers
a strategic complementarity in port charges. Ports could better exploit the third region if
they coordinated with each other on privatization since this would increase prices in the
third region. Since this positive pricing e¤ect on the other regions port prots is not taken
into account when deciding on privatization, there is (from the perspective of the two port
regions) too small of an incentive to privatize.
Our paper is also related to the literature on mixed oligopolies in which a public rm
competes with private rms in the market (e.g., de Fraja and Delbono, 1989). This frame-
work has been expanded to include interactions between governments and competition in
international market with two countries (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2005; Dadpay and Hey-
wood, 2006; Han and Ogawa, 2008). Whether or not privatization of public rms is welfare
increasing in these models depends on how well public rms can o¤set the market power
of private rms and to what extent public rms distort the allocation of output quantities
between rms. For the latter, cost structures play an important role. Our focus di¤ers
from these studies in the sense that we are not interested in the degree of privatization in an
oligopolistic market but rather in the decision whether or not to privatize a natural monopoly
(i.e., infrastructure).
Our paper may be considered to be a variant of models in the literature of strategic
trade policies (e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985), in that the government policies a¤ect the
competitive position in the international market. Interpreting our model in terms of inter-
national trade, countries export port services and compete in the third market. The choice
of port charges then corresponds to strategic tax policy. Therefore, our paper complements
the literature on strategic trade policy.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model. Section 3
investigates pricing competition between two ports under public and private operation. In
Section 4, we discuss port privatization and welfare e¤ects. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries (i = 1; 2), each with a single port, and a third region
(which may consist of various countries). We assume the spatial structure as in Figure 1
(similar to Takahashi, 2004) in which the two countries are points; the third region is a set
of locations on a continuous linear space between two countries with the length equal to b:5
Each location within the third region is represented by a coordinate value, x 2 [0; b], whereby
the locations of countries 1 and 2 are x = 0 and x = b, respectively.
Figure 1
5Matsumura and Matsushima (2012a) use a similar model in the context of a delegation game.
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In each of the two countries, there is demand for a transport service to some destination
in the rest of the world, for which the usage of one of the two ports is necessary. We assume
that local demand in each of the two countries uses the countrys local port. The demand
of the home market for the transport service of port i is given by:
DHi (pi) = ai   pi: (1)
Here, pi = ci+ i is the full pricefor a local customer of port i, with ci being operational
costs of a customer using port i (which might include time cost for cargo handling, line haul
cost on the trunk line, etc.) and  i being the port charge of port i: The customers operational
cost ci can also be interpreted as an inverse measure of the quality of port i; e.g., the shorter
handling times, the lower the cost of usage for the port customers will be. In most of the
analysis, we will concentrate on situations where in equilibrium DHi > 0; for i = 1; 2; which
holds if, for instance, a1 and a2 are su¢ ciently large.
The two ports also serve as connecting points (hubs) for trade with the third region
(cargoes are transshipped between feeder lines and trunk lines).6 There are b customers
with unit demand and valuation v for the transshipment service, distributed uniformly on
this interval. Customers from the third region also need to use one of the two ports and
have constant per distance transportation cost from using one of the two hubs of size t, in
addition to pi:We focus on full coverage equilibria, i.e., v is su¢ ciently large such that all of
the customers from the third region always buy the service. The customer who is indi¤erent
between ports 1 and 2 is determined by:
c1 +  1 + tx = c2 +  2 + t(b  x), x = bt  c1 + c2    1 +  2
2t
:
We call the demand of the third region for port services transshipmentdemand; for port
services of port 1 (2), demand is given by DT1 ( 1;  2)
 
DT2 ( 1;  2)

:
DT1 ( 1;  2) = x; D
T
2 ( 1;  2) = b  x: (2)
To ensure that DTi > 0 in equilibrium, we assume that the transportation cost t is su¢ ciently
high.7
There are two ways to operate a port: private and public. Under public operation, the











6Hub-spoke systems have been studied in the context of networks, i.e., graphs in which nodes are connected
by links (e.g., Hendricks, Piccione and Tan, 1999). Our model setting can be interpreted as a specic form
of a (simple) network in which each location in the third region (each point on the line) is a node connected
directly to two hubs.
7Private ports may concentrate on the local market when the market for transships is too competitive.
This does not occur when transportation costs t are su¢ ciently high. See Figure 4 for an illustration of the
corresponding critical values of t at which private ports are indi¤erent between exploitation of the local and
the transship markets or the local markets alone.
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and consists of the net benet of local customers (rst term) as well as the revenues from port
services to local customers and from transshipment demand (second term). Alternatively, a







We consider the following two-stage game. First, the governments in both countries
simultaneously decide on the mode of port operation (privatization or no privatization).
Given this, port charges are determined at stage two in order to maximize the objective
function implemented by the governments privatization decision. We solve the game by
backward induction.
It is important to stress that ports charge the same to both the home market customers
and the customers from the third region. A public port charging di¤erent (i.e., lower) prices
to home customers would typically violate the rules of the world trade organization (WTO)
for free transit. Article 5 of GATT 1994 states: With respect to all charges, regulations and
formalities in connection with transit, each contracting party shall accord to tra¢ c in transit
to or from the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favorable than the
treatment accorded to tra¢ c in transit to or from any third country.Private ports that
use price discrimination would in many jurisdictions violate non-discrimination obligations.9
Hence, in practice, most ports seem to not use price discrimination.10
3 Price competition
This section takes the modes of operation (that is, whether ports are public or private) as
given and considers the individual portsbest responses to the pricing of the rival port. In
a further step, equilibrium port charges are derived and discussed.
3.1 Portsbest responses
The public port operator chooses a port charge to maximize national welfare Wi; dened by








An increase in price has a direct negative impact on consumer surplus (which equals to DHi )
and a direct positive impact on local prots (which equals to DHi ). The two terms cancel
8Since we assume away the cost for port operation, the normal objective prot maximization is reduced
to revenue maximization. If we assumed that port operation cost was proportional to tra¢ c volume, we








9E.g., for Europe the EU Treaty requires in Art. 102: A dominant rm (for which the ports in our model
would typically qualify) must not apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties....
10However, non-tari¤ discrimination seems to play a role, in particular by imposing additional costs on
foreign transit customers. See, e.g., WTO G/C/W/22 (September 30, 2002), p. 4. It is obvious that in our
setup, neither a privately nor publicly operated port would have an incentive to raise a customers cost.
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out when the port maximizes national welfare. So the e¤ect associated with the market for
local customers is only the rst term,  i@DHi =@ i, which is negative in sign. The sum of 2nd
and 3rd terms, DTi +  i@D
T
i =@ i, is the marginal revenue from transshipment. If there is no
transshipment, the welfare maximizing charge is  i = 0. If the port provides transshipment
service, the national welfare can be increased by raising the port charge above zero, which
is at the expense of lower welfare for local customers.







with respect to  i. The corresponding rst-order condition is
DHi +  i
@DHi
@ i




Since we focus on situations for whichDHi > 0, a comparison of (4) and (5) immediately (and
unsurprisingly) shows that, for a given level of the rivals port charge, the public port charge
is smaller than the private port charge.11 Using our specications of demand functions (1)
and (2), we can explicitly calculate the best response function of a public port as12
TGi ( j) =










Likewise, the best response functions of private ports, T Pi ( j), and their slopes are
T Pi ( j) =










This establishes that prices of public and private port operators are strategic complements.
Furthermore, the slopes of the public portsbest response functions are steeper than their
private counterparts, @TGi =@ j > @T
P
i =@ j. Next, at  j = 0, we have T
P




11One can easily check that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised.
12The best response function of a public port in (6) is independent of local market size, measured by ai.
This is not generally the case. In view of (4), the results depend on the slope of the local demand. In our
model, the slope is  1, which is independent of ai.
13Using (6) and (7), we have
TPi (0)  TGi (0) =
t (2ai(1 + t)  bt  (1 + 2t)ci   cj)
2(1 + 3t+ 2t2)
:
When  i = TPi (0), we have D
H
i = (2ai(1 + t)  bt  (1 + 2t)ci   cj) = (2(1 + 2t)). Applying the condition
DHi > 0, we immediately have T
P
i (0)  TGi (0) > 0.
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a given port charge in the other region, the private operator sets a higher port charge than
the public operator when  j <  j (which ensures that local demand is strictly positive),
where  j = 2ai(1 + t)  bt  (1 + 2t)ci   cj. Figure 2 illustrates the best response functions
of public and private ports.
Figure 2
3.2 Equilibrium port charges
There are four combinations of modes of port operation in countries 1 and 2: case PP in
which ports in both countries are operated privately; caseGG in which ports in both countries
are operated publicly; case PG in which the port in country 1 is privately operated, while
the port in country 2 is publicly operated; and vice versa for the case GP: Let us denote the







Explicit expressions for the equilibrium port charges are provided in Appendix A.
We start the analysis of the second stage by investigating the e¤ect of the country size
ai and the operational costs ci on the equilibrium port charges.
Lemma 1 The e¤ect of local market size ai and operational costs ci on equilibrium port
charges can be described as:





















In words: (i) If both ports are privately operated, the port charge in the country with
the larger home market is higher, while the size of the home market has no e¤ect on public
port charges if both ports are public (the latter hinges upon the assumption that the slope
of the home marketsdemands are  1; see Footnote 12). (ii) With symmetric market sizes,
a reduction of operational costs at port i leads to an increase in is port charge. This implies
that a port with a higher quality of infrastructure (implying lower operational costs for its
customers) would charge a higher price in equilibrium. Note that ci also include costs related
to shipping on the ocean route. So a di¤erence in ci could represent the relative advantage
of portslocations from/to the trunk line. (iii) If one of the two ports is privatized, given
identical operational costs, the port charge of the privately operated port exceeds that of
its publicly operated counterpart. This is independent of the size of the country measured
by ai: For instance, the private port charge in the smaller country is higher than the public
port charge in the larger country.
Next, we examine how the di¤erent combinations of modes of port operation a¤ect the
level of port charges. We assume that two countries are symmetric, a1 = a2 = as and
c1 = c2 = cs. This leads to:
7
















The above results state that port charges tend to be higher as port privatization becomes
more prevalent. Note that even though the operator is unchanged, the port charge is higher






1 ) due to the strategic complemen-
tarity in pricing decisions. To explain PG1 > 
GP
1 , let us compare two cases of change, i.e.,
from GG1 to 
PG




1 . The rst change reects the direct e¤ect of port
privatization in the home country, which should be larger than the second change through
the indirect e¤ect of privatization of the rival port. Based on these results, we illustrate in
Figure 3 the best response functions and how the port charges di¤er in equilibrium for the
di¤erent modes of operation.
Figure 3
4 Welfare e¤ects of port privatization
This section is separated into three parts. The rst part derives and discusses equilibrium
port operations, while the second part identies the welfare e¤ects of port privatization. The
e¤ect of asymmetries in country sizes on port operations is identied in the third part.
4.1 Privatization as equilibrium policy choice
We turn to the rst stage of the game, i.e., the selection of modes of port operation by
the governments. By doing so, we identify the conditions under which each of the four
cases, PP; PG;GP;GG is realized in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Governments choose







i denote the national welfares for the above four cases, which are























We nd that for large parameter regions, countries have an incentive to privatize their
ports. It is the strategic interaction in the transshipment market which implies that pri-
vatization can ever increase national welfare, and that therefore privatization can occur in
equilibrium. Port charges are higher under privatization, and they are also strategic com-
plements. Therefore, privatizing at stage one is a valuable pre-commitment to set higher
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port charges at stage two. The best response of the other port (whether private or public)
is to also set a higher port charge. Thus, a government can expect much higher prices if
it privatizes at stage one. This leads to a much better exploitation of the third region via
the transshipment market but to a lower consumer surplus in the national market. If the
former outweighs the latter, privatization is welfare increasing and therefore the optimal
policy choice.
It is important to stress that the exploitation of the third region is not su¢ cient to derive
this result. The presence of competition, or strategic interaction with the rival country,
is essential. To understand this, consider a port that faces no competition. If the port is
private, the operator chooses the prot maximizing port charge. On the other hand, the
public port operator chooses the national welfare maximizing port charge. In this setting,
by denition, national welfare must be higher in the case of the public port. There is no
gain from privatization without strategic interaction.
We rst derive the equilibrium results for the choice of the mode of operation for the
symmetric case, a1 = a2 = as and c1 = c2 = cs. To understand the equilibrium outcomes,
it is useful to characterize the circumstances under which a country is indi¤erent between
private or public port operations, given the choice of the other country. This depends on
the protability of the transshipment market, determined by t; and the size of the home
markets (as) relative to the size of the transshipment market (b), which we measure bybas := 2 (as   cs) =b: If country 1 decided at stage one to privatize, then country 2 is indi¤erent
with respect to private or public port operation if
W PG2 (bas; t) = W PP2 (bas; t))bas = aPPGPs = 3 + 4t(5 + 4t(3 + 2t(2 + t)))1 + 16t(1 + t)2(1 + 2t) :
For the case that country 1 chose public port operations, the indi¤erence condition is
WGG2 (bas; t) = WGP2 (bas; t))bas = aPGGGs = 3 + 4t(4 + t(7 + 2t(3 + t)))2(1 + t)(1 + 2t)(1 + 2t(2 + t)) :
Figure 4 plots these indi¤erence conditions. It illustrates that both are downward sloping
for su¢ ciently low values of t, and slightly upward sloping for su¢ ciently high values of t. To
see why they can be downward sloping, consider a point on aPGGGs . Now, imagine that the
importance of the home market shrinks. This implies that, if the port is kept public, port
charges remain unchanged (see (6)), but the welfare contribution of the national market
becomes less important. Therefore, the government now opts for privatization since this
allows for better exploitation of the (now relatively more important) transshipment market.
Alternatively, consider again a point of aPGGGs but let the transshipment market become
more attractive, i.e., t increases. With such a change, the government may now prefer to
keep the port public. The reason is that the higher attractiveness of the transshipment
market leads to a steep increase in the private port charge, which (from the perspective of
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national welfare) decreases national consumer surplus too much. A similar reasoning holds
for aPPGPs .
Figure 4
Given the two critical values aPPGPs and a
PGGG
s ; we can directly identify the subgame
perfect privatization decision in Figure 4. We are mainly interested in equilibria in which all
markets (both home markets and the transshipment market) are served; therefore, we focus




the left of aHs ; the transshipment market is too unattractive, and below a
L
s , the home market
is too small to be served.15 The line aPGGGs is downward sloping for su¢ ciently low values of
t. This downward sloping part reects that the national market size and the attractiveness
of the transshipment market may be considered as substitutes for the government since
both favor public port operations. Hence, in the top-right area of Figure 4, keeping the ports
public is very attractive, independent of the behavior of the other country, and GG is the
equilibrium outcome. The opposite holds for low importance of the home market and low
attractiveness of the transshipment market, where PP is the equilibrium outcome.
If the home market takes an intermediate size, asymmetric equilibria are possible if t is
su¢ ciently large. If the other country privatized, it is then a best response not to privatize
since this would lead to a too strong increase in the port charges. Finally, there are also
multiple equilibria possible. If the home market is very important but the transport cost is
very small, keeping the port public is also an optimal response, given the large importance
of local consumer surplus. However, if the other country had privatized, following suit is
optimal: There is a positive gain in terms of better exploiting the transshipment market;
but since t is very small, the price increase is small as well.
These ndings discussed for Figure 4 are made precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that countries are symmetric and that the transshipment market is
su¢ ciently attractive, bas < aHs . (i) For bas  aPGGGs and bas  aPPGPs ; the subgame perfect
14To construct aHs ; consider the scenario with one public and one private port. Then calculate the claimed
equilibrium, which implies that all markets are served. Now calculate the deviation prot that results if
the private port were to deviate to serving only its home market. The critical value of t that renders this
deviation unprotable is given by the upward sloping line in Figure 4 and by:
aHs = 2




t (1 + 2t)
9 + 8t (5 + 4t (2 + t))
A similar line can be constructed for the case of two private ports. The critical value of t is to the left of
aHs . Similar lines do not exist for public ports. A private port abandons the transshipment market to charge
higher prices in the home market. If a public port were to fully abandon serving the transshipment market,
this would call for marginal cost pricing in the home market. However, with marginal cost pricing, there is
always positive transshipment sales.
On the other hand, aLs =
2t
1+2t , which is obtained by solving q
H
i = 0: All calculations are available from
the authors upon request.
15Therefore, below aLs the subgame perfect outcome is PP: To the left of a
H
s , our conjecture is that no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
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equilibrium is unique and the outcome is PP: (ii) For bas  aPPGPs and bas  aPGGGs ; the
subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and the outcome is GG: (iii) For t su¢ ciently large,
aPPGPs < a
PGGG
s : Then, if bas falls in this range, aPPGPs < bas < aPGGGs ; there are multiple
equilibria in that the outcome may be PG or GP: (iv) For low values of t; aPPGPs  aPGGGs :
Then, if bas falls in this range, aPGGGs < bas < aPPGPs ; there are multiple equilibria in that the
outcome may be GG or PP:
4.2 Welfare e¤ects
The previous section has shown that privatization can occur as an equilibrium choice of a
welfare maximizing government. Obviously, this need not imply that providing governments
with the option to privatize must increase total welfare of both countries. To analyze this,
we need to compare national welfare levels under PP and GG, W PPi and W
GG
i :
W PPi  WGGi =




  (as   cs)(1 + 2t)

(1 + 2t)2(1 + 4t)2
: (8)
Then, we derive the following:
W PPi > W
GG
i () aLs < bas < aPPGGs ; (9)
where aPPGGs = (1 + 4t+ 2t
2) =t (1 + 2t). The rst inequality is always satised if DHi > 0.






In other words, the parameter region for case PP to be the outcome of a subgame perfect
equilibrium is a strict subset of the region in whichW PPi > W
GG
i holds. This directly implies:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the two countries are symmetric. (i) Whenever privatization
PP is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, national welfare is higher in both port
countries compared to GG; i.e., a situation in which both ports remain public. (ii) If the size









, then in equilibrium governments will decide not to privatize,
while both countries would be better o¤ by privatizing their ports.
The rst part of the proposition implies that providing the governments with the option
to privatize, even if they cannot coordinate this decision, increases welfare of both countries.
The second part states that their individual incentive to privatize is too small: If the port
countries could coordinate, they would do so only in order to privatize the port infrastructure
more often.
To understand the rst part, i.e., why privatization is benecial, we take a closer look at
the relations between port charges and the national welfare. Di¤erentiating (3) with respect











An increase in  j induces larger transship demand in port i (@DTi =@ j > 0), thereby increas-
ing the welfare of country i.
Based on this result, Figure 5 shows country 1s indi¤erence curves, the locus of combi-
nations of ( 1;  2) that give the same level of national welfare. These indi¤erence curves are
upward sloping for  1 > TG1 ( 2) and downward sloping for  1 < T
G
1 ( 2).
17 The welfare level
of country 1 is larger since the curve lies to the right (see (10)). Suppose that the rivals
port charges are given by PP2 and 
GG
2 under PP and GG in Figure 5. The best response of
country 1 would be T P1 (
PP




2 ), thereby attaining pricing equilibria at points P
and G in the gure, respectively. The curves W PP1 and W
GG
1 correspond to these equilibria.
In the case of Figure 5, the national welfare of country i under PP is larger than that under
GG since the curve W PP1 lies to the right of W
GG
1 . Although the national welfare is not
maximized at the point P in response to PP2 , the point is better than the point G at which
the welfare is maximized in response to GG2 . Privatization of the two ports leads to higher
port charges in both countries 1 and 2. In other words, the decision to privatize becomes
a commitment to set higher port charges. The two countries enjoy higher welfare at the
expense of the third region using transshipment service at one of two ports.
National welfare is not increased by privatization if the size of the local demand (transship
demand) is relatively large (small), as suggested by (9). In this case, the contribution of the
revenue from transshipment to national welfare is relatively small. The increase in the port
charge by privatization therefore does not generate su¢ ciently large revenues to o¤set the
loss in local customerswelfare in this situation.
Figure 5
The second part of the Proposition 2 implies that (from the viewpoint of the two port
countries) there is an excessive national incentive to keep the ports public. This result can
be explained by a simple externality. The decision to privatize has three (direct) welfare
e¤ects: (i) It reduces welfare from their own national market, (ii) it increases their own
prots from the transshipment market, and (iii) it increases the other countries prots from
the transshipment market. Since the individual decision is based only on e¤ects (i) and (ii),
the individual incentive to privatize falls short of the joint benet from doing so.
Figure 4 illustrated that even in the symmetric case, asymmetric equilibria are possible
(PG and GP ) : From the decision of one country to privatize, both port countries benet
compared to a situation in which both ports are kept public. The reason is simple: Assume
that in equilibrium, the rst country privatizes while the second keeps its port public (PG) :
The result that the rst country is better o¤ compared to GG follows from the fact that
PG is a Nash equilibrium. The second country must also be better o¤ since we know from
(4) and (5) that privatization leads to an increase in the port charge for country 1,  1: This
17On the indi¤erence curve, (@W1=@1) d1+(@W1=@2) d2 = 0 holds. The slope of the curve is d1=d2 =
  (@W1=@2) = (@W1=@1). The numerator of the right-hand side is positive based on (10). On the other
hand, the denominator depend on the level of the port charge: since W1 is maximized at 1 = TG1 (2),
@W1=@1 is positive if 1 is smaller than TG1 (2) and vice versa.
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leaves welfare in the home market of country 2 una¤ected but increases demand for port 2s
service in the transshipment market, which strictly increases the welfare of country 2. This
reasoning is not restricted to the symmetric case.
Proposition 3 If the equilibrium outcome is PG or GP; both port countries are better o¤
compared to the outcome GG:
Welfare e¤ects for the third region are straightforward. Welfare for customers in the third
region is a¤ected by the sum of the full price and the transportation cost to the hub port.
Privatization of the ports raises the port charges and thereby users in the third region are
worse o¤. For the economy as a whole, which consists of two countries and the third region,
privatization reduces total welfare. The benets of privatization for two countries stem from
increased port revenues paid by the third region, which cancel out with the loss of the third
region.18 So the welfare e¤ect of privatization on the economy as a whole is equal to the
losses of local consumer surplus in the two countries due to the increasing port charge.
4.3 E¤ect of asymmetries between countries
We next consider a situation in which the two countries are asymmetric in country size.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country 2 is larger. The asymmetry is represented
by setting a1 = as ; a2 = as+; where   0; holding constant the total size of the market
(dened as a1+ a2+ b). Investigating the condition for each case yields the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the home market of country 2 is larger than that of country 1.
As asymmetry in country size () increases,
(i) the case PG is more likely to emerge in equilibrium,
(ii) the cases PP , GG, and GP are less likely to emerge in equilibrium.
The equilibrium with a private port in the smaller country and a public port in the
larger country is more likely to emerge when the asymmetry in country size increases. The
smaller country has a larger incentive to choose private port operation since the revenue from
transshipment makes a relatively large contribution to national welfare. Recall that those
ports with a large share of transshipment mentioned in the introduction (Singapore, Hong
Kong and Busan) are located in small countries. These ports compete with ports in large
countries such as Shenzen, Shanghai in China, etc., and we observe that they are actively
introducing private operation and attracting investments by private funds.19 Proposition 4
is consistent with the above observations.
18That revenues cancel out is due to the assumption that the aggregate demand for transship services is
perfectly inelastic as long as there is full coverage.
19Singapore port had been managed and controlled by the former Port of Singapore Authority until 1997.
Following several steps of reorganization, PSA International now operates the port facilities not only in
Singapore but also in many ports in Europe, Asia, and the Mid East. It now has commercial objectives
and takes decisions on a commercial basis. At the same time, it does remain an entirely government-owned
entity with a wholly owned subsidiary of the Government (i.e., Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited), holding
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5 Conclusions
This paper shows that welfare maximizing governments may choose private operation of their
ports in equilibrium and that national welfare under private port operation can be larger
than in the case of public port operation. Choosing private port operation can be perceived
as a commitment to charge higher prices: Since port charges are strategic complements, the
opportunity to commit to higher prices by delegating the pricing decision to a private port
operator can be mutually benecial for port countries. However, a non-cooperative choice of
the mode of port operation leads to too little privatization from the perspective of the two
port countries since each government does not account for the benets from privatization to
accrue to the other country. Privatization as such is clearly harmful from the viewpoint of the
international transshipment market since its only aim is to better exploit the transshipment
customers.
The key driver of our results is that the decisions taken by the ports are strategic com-
plements. In our model, this is implied by our choice to model competition between ports as
price competition. This ts well in the context of which countries consider the privatization
of existing ports with excess capacities. However, it is sometimes suggested that port compe-
tition may alternatively be modeled using quantity competition (see, e.g., Wan and Zhang,
2013). We therefore note that for the strategic complementarity to occur, price competition
is not a necessary assumption. In fact, port decisions can also be strategic complements
when ports compete in quantities.20 Intuitively, even with quantity competition, port pri-
vatization is a commitment to reduce the transshipment quantity, implying an increase in
the transshipment price. The rival port may then react to this by decreasing its quantity
when quantities are strategic complements, making port privatization more attractive for
each country.
For public policy discussion, our paper implies an additional argument for privatizing
100 percent of the PSA Corporations shares (Cullinane, Yap and Lam, 2007). A higher degree of private
involvement is observed in the port of Hong Kong. Container terminal facilities are all privately owned
and operated by four private companies: Modern Terminals Ltd., DPI Terminals, Hongkong International
Terminals (HIT) Ltd. and COSCO-HIT Terminals (HK) Ltd. The Hong Kong government is the lessor of
land sites to the private terminal operating companies (Song and Cullinane, 2007). In Korea, the Busan
Port Authority (BPA), a public and private combined entity, is responsible for developing, managing and
operating the Port of Busan and the surrounding areas. BPA rents out the terminals to private operators,
including international mega operators such as Hutchison Port Holdings. This scheme was established in
2004 to promote greater private sector participation in port development. Accordingly, New Busan Port is
under construction by attracting private investment through various forms of public-private partnerships,
such as BTO (Song and Lee, 2007).
20One can show that quantities are strategic substitutes in our model with xed total transship demands,
which eliminates the incentives for strategic privatization. However, consider a variation of our model in
which transshipment demands are linear in port charges with DTi = b    i +  j , ( > 0), and domestic
demands are given by DHi = ai    i, ( > 0). Furthermore, let ports compete in quantities. The best
response functions of public ports are upward sloping when  is su¢ ciently large. Note that quantities
can be strategic complements because an increase in the rivals quantities may increase their own domestic
supplies and reduce thir own transship supplies, given their own total supply (i.e., the sum of own domestic
and transship supplies). Details are available from the authors upon request.
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port infrastructure, in addition to the well understood argument that private operation
may imply lower cost than public operation. Whenever there is a signicant transshipment
demand from outside their own jurisdiction, from a purely national perspective, a national
government should consider privatization. This is true even though privatization as such (i.e.,
with no cost e¤ect) tends to lead to higher prices and therefore lower domestic consumer
surplus.
The gain in national welfare arises in the form of larger prots for the port operator.
This may be viewed as an undesirable distributional e¤ect within the port country. This
distributional e¤ect can, however, easily be avoided if the port operation is privatized in a
competitive standard auction. This allows the government to appropriate all port prots.
Since auction payments are sunk costs for the operator, none of our results would be a¤ected
(which would obviously not be true if one would use a non-lump sum tax to correct for the
distributional e¤ects). In addition, for national governments with important port facilities,
it could be useful to coordinate their privatization decisions to overcome the problem of the
excessive individual incentive to keep the ports public.
From the point of view of the transshipment market, the opposite holds true. Clearly,
customers from abroad benet if a port is left public, since public charges are lower as a
result that the operator wants to be soft on national customers. In particular, coordination
of port countries to jointly privatize their hubs should be of concern to customers from the
transshipment market.
This paper introduces a number of assumptions to simplify the analysis. First, we assume
that perfect competition persists in the carrier market, which may not be compatible with
the presence of mega-carriers observed in reality. Second, we ignore scale economies in port
operation, which is a driving force behind the adoption of hub-spoke system. To incorporate
this aspect, we should explicitly formulate the benet of using the large scale port that
many other users use. It would be useful to examine the e¤ect of carrier market power and
scale economies on the consequences of transshipment routes and port competition, as well
as the resulting implications on privatization.21 Third, we recognize that port privatization
may accompany regulation to control market power of the private operator, as in the case
of airports. We should look at the commonalities and di¤erences in the organizational
structure of ports and airports in considering how to design the regulatory schemes suitable
for ports. In doing so, it is essential to take into account the asymmetric information between
the operator and the government, as well as the interaction among di¤erent stakeholders.
Finally, it would be benecial to consider some practical aspects in port development such
as, e.g., investment in port facilities; intra-port competition in which two or more di¤erent
terminal operators provide the service within the same port; or the behavior of mega-terminal
operators serving at many di¤erent ports in the world.
21Czerny et al. (2012) analyze the relationship between route choices and scale economies in the context
of airline alliances and mergers. The framework developed by Mori and Nishikimi (2002) may also be useful
for the analysis of these types of problems.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium port charges















. Using (7), we have
PP1 =









bt(2t+ 3)  (c1   c2)(2t+ 1)
4t(t+ 2) + 3
; (A2a)
GG2 =
bt(2t+ 3)  (c2   c1)(2t+ 1)




4a1t(t+ 1) + bt(2t+ 3)  c1 (4t2 + 6t+ 1) + c2(2t+ 1)
4t(2t+ 3) + 3
; (A3a)
PG2 =
2t (a1 + c1   2c2) + bt(4t+ 3) + c1   c2




2t (a2   2c1 + c2) + bt(4t+ 3)  c1 + c2
4t(2t+ 3) + 3
; (A4a)
GP2 =
4a2t(t+ 1) + bt(2t+ 3)  c2 (4t2 + 6t+ 1) + c1(2t+ 1)




Using (A1)-(A4) in the Appendix A, we have
PP1   PP2 =
2 ((a1   a2)t  (c1   c2) (t+ 1))
4t+ 3
(B1)
GG1   GG2 =
2(c2   c1)(2t+ 1)
4t(t+ 2) + 3
(B2)
PG1   PG2 =
2 (a1(2t+ 1)t  bt2   c1 (2t2 + 4t+ 1) + 3c2t+ c2)
8t2 + 12t+ 3
: (B3)
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Part (i) can be immediately shown by setting c1 = c2 and a1 < a2 in (B1) and (B2). Part
(ii) can be shown in a similar way. To establish part (iii), note that c1 = c2 implies that the
numerator of (B3) becomes 2t((a1  c1)(2t+1)  bt), which is positive as long as DH1 > 0.
Lemma 2
Substituting a1 = a2 = as and c1 = c2 = cs into (A1a)-(A4a) yields:
PP1   PG1 =
2t ((as   cs)(1 + 2t)  bt)
(1 + 4t)(3 + 4t(3 + 2t))
;
PG1   GP1 =
2t ((as   cs)(1 + 2t)  bt)
3 + 4t(3 + 2t)
;
GP1   GG1 =
2t ((as   cs)(1 + 2t)  bt)
(1 + 2t)(3 + 4t(3 + 2t))
:
It turns out that the signs of the right-hand sides of the above equations all depend on that of







i in the symmetric case for D
H
i , we see that D
H
i > 0 is equivalent to
(as   cs)(1 + 2t)  bt > 0. Applying this inequality to the one above, we have GG1 < GP1 <
PG1 < 
PP















2 . This implies that the inequality for country 2 holds.
Proposition 1


















which can be rewritten as (recall the denition bas := 2(as   cs)=b) :
aLs < bas < aPPGPs , where aLs = 2t(1 + 2t) and aPPGPs = 3 + 4t(5 + 4t(3 + 2t(2 + t)))1 + 16t(1 + t)2(1 + 2t) :
Note that the condition above is obtained by supposing DHi > 0, which is equivalent to
aLs < bas. If bas  aLs , DHi = 0, and the national welfare is reduced to the revenue from the
transship market. In this case, the national welfare maximization is equivalent to revenue
maximization. This situation is also regarded as private operation. So the condition for the
case PP is simply bas < aPPGPs :
Case GG: The condition for this case is WGG1 > W
PG
1 . In the same manner as above,
we have the following condition:
aPGGGs < bas; where aPGGGs = 3 + 4t(4 + t(7 + 2t(3 + t)))2(1 + t)(1 + 2t)(1 + 2t(2 + t)) :







which are equivalent to:
aPPGPs < bas < aPGGGs :
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Proposition 3







case PG emerges in equilibrium. The rst inequality is an equilibrium condition for case
PG. For country 2, W PG2 > W
GG
2 is equivalent to a
L
s < bas, which is satised when the
condition W PG1 > W
GG
1 holds (see proof of Proposition 1 above).
Proposition 4
First, we derive the conditions for each case to emerge in equilibrium.






2 are equivalent to a
L
1 < bas <
aPPGP1 and a
L
2 < bas < aPPPG2 ,respectively, where
aL1 = 2
t(3 + 4t) + (3 + 14t+ 8t2)
b
3 + 10t+ 8t2
(B4)
aPPGP1 =
(4t+ 3)(4t(4t(2t(t+ 2) + 3) + 5) + 3)
(4t+ 3) (16t(2t+ 1)(t+ 1)2 + 1)
+
2(4t+ 1)(8t(2t(t(2t+ 7) + 8) + 7) + 9)
b
(4t+ 3) (16t(2t+ 1)(t+ 1)2 + 1)
(B5)
aL2 = 2
t(3 + 4t)  (3 + 14t+ 8t2)
b
3 + 10t+ 8t2
(B6)
aPPPG2 =
(4t+ 3)(4t(4t(2t(t+ 2) + 3) + 5) + 3)
(4t+ 3) (16t(2t+ 1)(t+ 1)2 + 1)
 2(4t+ 1)(8t(2t(t(2t+ 7) + 8) + 7) + 9)

b
(4t+ 3) (16t(2t+ 1)(t+ 1)2 + 1)
: (B7)






1 hold true, thereby the above conditions
are reduced to aL1 < bas < aPPPG2 .






2 are rewritten as a
PGGG
1 < bas and aGPGG2 < bas,
respectively, where
aPGGG1 = 2
(4t(t(2t(t+ 3) + 7) + 4) + 3)






(4t(t(2t(t+ 3) + 7) + 4) + 3)




Since aGPGG2 < a
PGGG
1 hold, the above conditions are reduced to a
PGGG
1 < bas.






2 are rewritten as a
L
s + 2=b < bas < aPGGG1
and aPPPG2 < bas, respectively, and are reduced to aPPPG2 < bas < aPGGG1 . Equilibrium of case










2 are rewritten as a
PPGP
1 < bas and aLs  2=b <bas < aGPGG2 , respectively, and are reduced to aPPGP1 < bas < aGPGG2 . Equilibrium of case GP
does not exist when aPPGP1 > a
GPGG
2 :
(i) From (B8), the upper bound of the region of case PG, aPGGG1 , is increasing with ,
while the lower bound, aPPPG2 , is decreasing with  from (B7). Thus, the parameter range
of PG is expanded by the increase in the size di¤erence.
(ii) For the case PP , aL1 < bas should hold from the condition DHi > 0. The region of
the case PP is reduced by increasing the size di¤erence since aPPPG2 is decreasing with .
Likewise, the region of the case GG is reduced since aPGGG1 is increasing in . For the case
GP , the range aGPGG2   aPPGP1 is decreasing in .
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            Figure 5  Equilibrium port charges and national welfare 
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